Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 31, Issue 4

2007

Article 6

Proving State Responsibility for Genocide:
The ICJ in Bosnia v. Serbia and the
International Commission of Inquiry for
Darfur
Ademola Abass∗

∗

Copyright c 2007 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj

Proving State Responsibility for Genocide:
The ICJ in Bosnia v. Serbia and the
International Commission of Inquiry for
Darfur
Ademola Abass

Abstract
This Article discusses the Bosnia v. Serbia case and the Darfur Inquiry and asks whether, in
coming to their respective decisions on Serbia and Sudan’s responsibilities, the ICJ and the ICID
did all that was required of them, especially under the law of State responsibility. This Article first
considers whether, despite striking similarities in the circumstances of Darfur and Srebrenica, the
ICID’s decision that genocide did not occur in Darfur is credible, defensible and could withstand
legal analysis under international law. The analysis here juxtaposes the ICID’s findings with the
ICJ’s decision on the Srebrenica genocide.

ARTICLES
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AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION
OF INQUIRY FOR DARFUR
Ademola Abass*
INTRODUCTION
In the case Bosnia v. Serbia,1 the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") decided that Serbia had not committed genocide
through its organs or persons whose acts engage its responsibility
under customary international law. The Court, however, did
find that genocide occured in Srebrenica. 2 About two years
before that decision, the International Commission of Inquiry
for Darfur ("ICID" or the "Commission") determined, somewhat
similarly, that the Government of the Sudan had not pursued a
policy of genocide.3 The commission concluded that genocide
did not occur in Darfur.4
Despite considerable synergy in the jurisprudence of both
bodies on such issues as the standards for proving the ultimo ratio
of the crime of genocide, dolus specialis, a close reading of the
decisions raises serious questions of international law about
* Professor of Law, Brunel University, West London. Many thanks to Manisuli
Ssenyonjo, Kwathar Benkheli and Claire Namy for their comments on an earlier draft.
All errors remain solely mine.
1. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.) (Judgment of Feb. 26, 2007), availableat
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2008) [hereinafter Bosnia v. Serbia case].
2. See id. 297.
3. See generally Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on Darfur [ICID], Report of the International
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary General, U.N. Doc. S/2005/
60 (Jan. 25, 2005), available at http://wvw.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com-inq-darfur.
pdf [hereinafter IC/D Report].
4. See Matthew Happold, Darfur, the Security Council and the International Criminal
Court, 55 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 226 (2006); see also Linnea D. Manashaw, Genocide and
Ethnic Cleansing: Why the Distinction?A Distinction in the Context of Atrocities Occurring in
Sudan, 35 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 303 (2005). See generally GERARD PRUNIER, DARFUR: THE
AMBIGUOUS GENOCIDE (2005).
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proving State responsibility for genocide and, in particular, the
application of the rules for attributing crimes to States.
This Article discusses the Bosnia v. Serbia case and the Darfur Inquiry and asks whether, in coming to their respective decisions on Serbia and Sudan's responsibilities, the ICJ and the
ICID did all that was required of them, especially under the law
of State responsibility. This Article first considers whether, despite striking similarities in the circumstances of Darfur and
Srebrenica, the ICID's decision that genocide did not occur in
Darfur is credible, defensible and could withstand legal analysis
under international law. The analysis here juxtaposes the ICID's
findings with the ICJ's decision on the Srebrenica genocide.
I. THE DARFUR CRISIS
A. The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur
On September 18, 2004, the United Nations ("U.N.") Security Council, as part of its multifaceted efforts to resolve the Darfur crisis,5 adopted Resolution 1564 under Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter, requesting the U.N. Secretary General to "rapidly
establish an international commission of inquiry in order immediately to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to
determine also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred."6
The ICID was comprised of Professor Antonio Cassese, former President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY"), Mohamed Fayek, Hina Jilani,
Dumisa Ntsebeza, and Therese Striggner-Scott,7 and was to report back on its findings within three months of its inauguration.' On January 25, 2005, the Commission submitted an extensive report to the U.N. Secretary-General. 9 It found that war
crimes and crimes against humanity occurred in Darfur.1" On
the specific question of whether genocide occurred in Darfur,
the Commission was doubtful, holding that the Government of
5. For an excellent account of Sudan's conflicts, see RUTH IYOB & GILBERT M.
THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR PEACE (2006) and Tim NIBLOCK, CLASS
POWER IN SUDAN: THE DYNAMICS OF SUDANESE POLITICS, 1898-1985 (1987).
6. S.C. Res. 1564, 1 12, UN Doc. S/RES/1564 (Sept. 18, 2004).
7. See ICID Report, supra note 3, 2.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
391-93.

KHADIAGALA, SUDAN:
AND
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the Sudan had not pursued a policy of genocide in Darfur. 1
B. Did Genocide Occur in Darfur? The InternationalCommission of
Inquiry on Darfur's ("ICID") Findings
From the start, the ICID recognized that it was "not a judicial body,"12 although it adopted an approach proper to a judicial body in classifying the facts according to international criminal law. However, given the "limitations inherent in its powers,"13 the ICID decided not to comply with the standards
normally adopted by criminal courts (proof of facts beyond a
reasonable doubt),14 or with those used by international prosecutors and judges in cases for the purpose of confirming indictments (that there must be a prima facie case). 5 Instead, the
ICID stated "that the most appropriatestandardwas requiring a reliable body of material consistent with other verified circumstances, which
tends to show that a person may reasonably be suspected of being involved in the commission of a crime."'16
The ICID examined reports compiled by independent bodies, interviewed several government officials and victims of Darfur atrocities, and evaluated accounts of the Government of Sudan and rebel groups. 7 Following an inspiring analysis of international law, the Commission concluded that "[s]ome elements
emerging from the facts including the scale of atrocities and the
systematic nature of the attacks, killing, displacement and rape,
as well as racially motivated statements by perpetrators that have
targeted members of the African tribes only, could be indicative
of genocidal intent."' 8 Nevertheless, the Commission stated that
there were other more indicative elements that showed the lack
of genocidal intent. 19 In support of this, it recounted the patterns of attacks on villages, and since these examples are vital to
its conclusions, the facts of one of such attacks are reproduced as
follows:
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See id. 489-522, 626-42.
See id. 14.
See id. 15.
See id.
See id.
Id.(emphasis added).
See id.1 20-25.
Id. 513.
See id.
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The fact that in a number of villages attacked and burned by
both militias and Government forces the attackers refrained
from exterminating the whole population that had not fled,
but instead selectively killed groups of young men, is an important element. A telling example is the attack of 22 January
2004 on Wadi Saleh, a group of 25 villages inhabited by about
11,000 Fur. According to credible eye witnesses questioned
by the Commission, after occupying the villages the Government Commissioner and the leader of the Arab militias that
had participated in the attack and burning, gathered all those
who had survived or who had not managed to escape into a
large area. Using a microphone they selected 15 persons
(whose names they read from a written list), as well as 7
omdas, and executed them on the spot. They then sent elderly men, all boys, many men and all women to a nearby village, where they held them for some time, whereas they executed 205 young villagers, who they asserted were rebels
(Torabora). According to male witnesses interviewed by the
Commission and who were among the survivors, about 800
persons were not killed (most young men of those spared by
attackers were detained for some time in the Mukjar
prison) .2o
From these facts the Commission therefore inferred that:
[T] he intent of the attackers was not to destroy an ethnic group
as such, or part of the group. Instead, the intention was to
murder all those men they considered as rebels, as well as
forcibly expel the whole population so as to vacate the villages
among, or getting support
and prevent rebels from hiding
21
from, the local populations.
The Commission further alluded to other instances, which, it believed, rebutted any intent to commit genocide. In fact:
[P] ersons forcibly displaced from their villages are collected
in IDP camps. In other words, the population surviving attacks on villages are not killed outright, so as to eradicate the
group; they are rather forced to abandon their homes and
live together in the areas selected by the Government. While
this attitude of the Sudanese Government may be held to be
in breach of international legal standards on human rights
and international criminal law rules, it is not indicative of any
20. Id. (emphasis added).
21. Id. 1 514 (emphasis added).
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intent to annihilate the group.2 2
On the basis of the above reasoning, the Commission declared
that:
[T]he Government of Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide. Arguably, two elements of genocide might be deduced from the gross violations of human rights perpetrated
by Government forces and the militias under their control.
These two elements are: first, the actus reus consisting of killing, or causing serious bodily or mental harm, or deliberately
inflicting conditions of life likely to bring about physical destruction; and, second, on the basis of a subjective standard,
the existence of a protected group being targeted by the authors of criminal conduct. Recent developments have led to
the perception and self-perception of members of African
tribes and members of Arab tribes as making up two distinct
ethnic groups. However, one crucial element appears to be
missing, at least as far as the central Government authorities
are concerned: genocidal intent. Generally speaking the policy of attacking, killing and forcibly displacing members of
some tribes does not evince a specific intent to annihilate, in
whole or in part, a group distinguished on racial, ethnic, national or religious grounds. Rather, it would seem that those
who planned and organized attacks on villages pursued the
intent to drive the victims from their homes,
primarily for
23
purposes of counter-insurgency warfare.
The ICID's rationales for holding that genocide did not occur in Darfur, despite establishing that various forms of actus
reus existed, are viz: (1) the attackers have refrained from "exterminating the whole population that have not fled, but instead
selectively killed groups of young men;" 24 (2) the forcible expulsion of whole populations took place "so as to vacate the villages
and prevent rebels from hiding among, or getting support from,
the local populations. '"25
C. Analysis of ICID's Findings
1. Selective Actus Reus vs. Specific Intent
At first glance, the ICID's rationale that selective actus reus
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

515 (emphasis added).
518.
513.
514.
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precludes genocidal intent in Darfur appears consistent with the
international law jurisprudence on dolus specialis. In Bosnia v.
Serbia, the ICJ stated, concerning the Srebrenica massacre, that
"while 'l[t] he VRS26 may have initially considered only targeting military men for execution .... [the] evidence shows, however, that a

decision was taken, at some point, to capture and kill all the Bosnian Muslim men indiscriminately. No effort was made to distinguish the soldiers from the civilians."' 27 Arguably, the Court's
reference to a subsequent decision by the Vojska Republike
Srpskse ("VRS") to kill Bosnian Muslims indiscriminatelyseems to
suggest that had the VRS confined its attack to Bosnian men of
military age, the Court could have found, as did the ICID, that
the actus reus did not manifest the intent to destroy the people
in part or in whole.
The issue of whether the Darfur attackers killed all or some
of their victims raises the question as to how many people have
to be killed, and under what circumstances, for the act to manifest genocidal intent. To be sure, Article II of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
the defining matrix of genocide, is laconic and offers no insights
into this nebulous phrase.2 8 Nor are the travaux preparatoiresany
more helpful.2 9
Academic and judicial attempts to calibrate the meaning of
"in whole or in part" have been steady and remarkable. A consensus has so far emerged that genocide does not imply the extermination of the whole population of the protected group.
The crime "may be found to have been committed where the
intent is to destroy the group within a geographically limited
area.""° In the Commentary to its Articles on the Draft Code of Crimes
against the Peace and Security of Mankind, the International Law
Commission ("ILC") noted, "[i]t is not necessary to intend to
achieve the complete annihilation of a group from every corner
of the globe."3 1 Nehemiah Robinson commented that the num26. The Serbian Army of Bosnia.
292 (emphasis added).
27. Bosnia v. Serbia case, supra note 1,
28. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into forceJan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide
Convention].
29. See Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, June 26, 1947, U.N. Doc. E/
447, at 24 (prepared by the Secretary-General).
30. Bosnia v. Serbia case, supra note 1, 199.
31. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, U.N.
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ber of victims had to be substantial, even if it was left for the
court to decide whether "the number was sufficiently large."3 2
Benjamin Whitaker contended that the term "in part" implied "a
reasonably significant number, relative to the total of the group
as a whole, or else a significantsection of a group such as its leadership. ' 33 In Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR") promoted the
view that there must be "a considerable number" of victims for
the crime to qualify as genocide, 4 while, in Prosecutor v. Jelisi(,
the ICTY preferred the formula "a substantial part," although
not a "very important part."3 5
It can be argued that in deciding whether genocide occurred in Darfur, the ICID stretched the meaning of "in whole
or in part" to a breaking point. In interpreting that phrase, the
Commission should have determined whether a significant portion of the immediately endangered "part" (the military-aged
Darfurians) of the wider protected group (the entire population
of black Darfurians) was targeted. The relevant "part," in this
instance, should therefore be a significant part of the "whole" of
the group cornered by the killers,3 6 even if this forms but a fraction

of the whole of the black Darfurian population.
It is possible that the military-aged men of Darfur may be no
more than one hundred men out of approximately three million
black Darfurians. 3 7 Killing sixty or seventy of the hundred fighters, with the full complement of dolus specialis, satisfies the requirement "in part or in whole" since the relevant "whole" here
GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (May 6-July 26, 1996), reprinted
in [1996] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 45, U.N. Doc. A/Cn.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1 (Part 2).
32. NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 58 (1960).
33. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Protection Of Minorities, Review of FurtherDevelopment in the Fields with which the
Sub-Commission has been Concerned: Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 29, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6 (July
2, 1985) (prepared by Benjamin Whitaker) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Whitaker Report].
34. Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment, 97
(May 21, 1999).
35. Prosecutor v. Jelisit, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, 91 81-82 (Dec. 14, 1999).
36. See generally Whitaker Report, supra note 33, 9129.
37. The ratio of military-aged males in Sudan in relation to the rest of the population is approximately 1:8. See Cent. Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook - Sudan,
https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/ the-world-factbook/geos/su. html (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
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is not the entire three million blacks of Darfur, but the one hundred military-aged men targeted for elimination. Thus, with respect to the men killed at Wadi Saleh on the basis of their being
rebels ("Tora Boras"),38 the correct formulae that the ICID
should have adopted in deciding the phrase "in part" should
have been whether the eliminated people, selected from the captured part of the whole of the protected group at Wadi Saleh,
formed such a substantial part of that group as to warrant its
physical destruction by the elimination.
Had the Commission adopted this approach, the extermination of some 205 military-aged men at Wadi Saleh, on January
22, 2004, 3 might have satisfied the requirement of the specific
intent to destroy "in part," if this number formed a substantial
part of the whole of all the military-aged men living in those villages. It was profoundly mistaken to conceive "in part," in this
context, relative to the "whole" of the black population of Darfur, or to preclude dolus specialis simply because the assailants
made a selection of death candidates from a pre-determined list.
Apart from being illogical, such an approach takes the wind out
of the sail of the Genocide Convention altogether.
Interestingly, the ICJ was faced in Bosnia v. Serbia with exactly the same situation (originally dealt with by the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Blagojevie) with regards to the fate of civilians under the
protection of the United Nations Protection Force ("UNPROFOR") at Potocari.4° In an interesting exchange between
General Ratko Mladi6 of the Serbian forces and a Dutch Colonel, who had come to negotiate safe passage of people under the
UNPROFOR protection in the so-called "safe area," General
Mladie was reported to have said that the civilian population was
not the target of his actions.4 Yet despite the separation of the
young, the old and the elderly from the rest of the population
and notwithstanding admitted video evidence that the Srebrenica attackers did not intend to exterminate the whole population,42 the Trial Chamber correctly held that specific intent existed. The Chamber said:
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

2005).

See
See
See
See
See

ICID Report, supra note 3,
513.
id.
Bosnia v. Serbia case, supra note 1, 1 280-91.
id. 1 286.
generally Prosecutor v. Blagojevit, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment (Jan. 17,
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[It] has no doubt that all these acts constituted a single operation
executed with the intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica. The Trial Chamber finds that the Bosnian Serb forces not only knew that the combination of the
killings of men with the forcible transfer of women, children
and elderly, would inevitably result in the physical disappearance of the Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica, but
clearly 43
intended through these acts to physically destroy this
group.
The ICJ also agreed with the ICTY Appeals Chamber's ruling in
Prosecutorv. Krstie, that "the destruction of such a sizeable number of men would 'inevitably result in the physical disappearance
of the Bosnian Muslim population at Srebrenica.' "4
Clearly, there is a striking similarity in these facts and those
of Darfur. The elimination of the Tora Boras of Wadi Saleh had
taken place along with other acts, such as the forcible relocation
of women and children. The question therefore is, why does it
matter in Darfur that those who killed innocent civilians did so
after separating the boys from the men, the women from the
elderly?
In the most recent attempt at clarifying the concept of "in
whole or in part," the ICJ said, in Bosnia v. Serbia, that:
[T]he intent must be to destroy at least a substantial part of
the particular group. That is demanded by the very nature of
the crime of genocide: since the object and purpose of the
Convention as a whole is to prevent the intentional destruction of groups, the part targeted must be significantenough to have
an impact on the group as a whole.45

The ICJ's interpretation is particularly instructive since, by recognizing that genocide could be committed when the "part
targeted [is] significant enough to have an impact on the group
as a whole," the view corroborates the point earlier made that
eliminating a substantial part of the military-aged black Darfurians could potentially amount to genocide. This interpretation
seems to give the best effect to the purpose of the Genocide
Convention and the nature of the crime itself and makes more
sense in the context of Darfur. As the Court further noted, it
43. Id. 677 (emphasis added).
44. Prosecutor v. Krstit, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, 28 (Apr. 19, 2004).
45. Bosnia v. Serbia case, supra note 1, 198 (emphasis added).
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may be that "the opportunity available to the alleged perpetrator
[of genocide]
is so limited that the substantiality criterion is not
6
4

met.

The Genocide Convention does not specify how many
deaths equal genocide, but it is not in doubt that huge numbers
are not present with regard to Tora Boras of Wadi Saleh. The
U.N. General Assembly regarded the massacre at Sabra and Shatila as genocide even though victims numbered only a few hundred.4 7 International law requires, under the principle of res
magis valeat quam pereat, that the rules of genocide should be interpreted in such a manner as to give them maximum legal effect. 4s In Staki, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY indicated the
need for caution, lest this strained approach-such as ICID took
with regards to Darfur-might distort the definition of genocide.4 9

2. Actus Reus for Counterinsurgency Purposes
Aside from relying on the selective nature of Darfur killings,
the ICID also sought to negate genocidal intent on the basis that
the forcible sacking of villages in Darfur was committed for
counterinsurgency purposes or in order to block villager support
for rebels. But really, should it matter what motive one has for
committing prohibited acts when determining genocide?
As an international law rule, motive neither justifies nor excuses genocide. The ICID recognized that "special intent must
not be confused with motive, namely the particular reason that
may induce a person to engage in criminal conduct ....

From

the viewpoint of criminal law, what matters is not the motive, but
rather whether or not there exists the requisite special intent to
destroy a group."50 Yet the ICID's rationale under consideration
could hardly be construed in any other way than it being a motive for the act. From the report, it is clear that it was partly the
ICID's reliance on this motive that led to its hasty conclusion
that the actus reus did not manifest a genocidal intent. It was
46. Id. 9 199.
47. See G.A Res. 37/123D, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/123 (Dec. 16, 1982); see also
Nsongurua J. Udombana, An Escapefrom Reason: Genocide and the InternationalCommission oflnquiy on Darfur,40 INT'L LAw. 41 (2006).
48. See ICID Report, supra note 3, 494.
49. See generally Prosecutor v. Stakit, No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment Uuly 31, 2003).
493.
50. ICID Report, supra note 3,
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sheer pedantry, and nothing more pretentious, that the Commission attempted to distinguish between reason and motive from
the facts of the Wadi Saleh murders. For all intents and purposes, the distinction is without a difference.
It may be the fact that the ICID had to conduct its inquiry
while the conflict in Darfur unfolded that severely limited its
ability to function accurately in regard to locating the specific
intent to commit genocide in Darfur. Evidence of inaccuracy
abounds in the Commission's report. In several passages, the
Commission acknowledged the existence of indiscriminateattacks
levelled by government forces and the Janjaweed. It confirmed
that during many attacks, the joint team of the Sudanese Army
and the Janjaweed militias said to their victims, "you are Tora
Bora, the SLA are your families," "the Fur are slaves, we will kill
them," "we are here to eradicate blacks (nuba)."5 1 Nonetheless,
the Commission chose to discount such evidence because the
"victims did not differentiate between Government armed forces
on the one hand, and militias, and other groups acting, or perceived to be acting, with the support of Government, on the
other." 2 It is rather surprising that the ICID did not spot its
farcical pedantry when some victims, questioned whether they
could distinguish between soldiers and militias from the band of
assailants, had responded: "for us, these are one and the
same." 53 Apparently, in the universe of the ICID's logic, the victims of Darfur attacks would do better if they were able to, with a
fine-toothed comb, distinguish between the various categories of
assailants wielding dangerous weapons and about to exterminate
them.
What remains to be said is that since the ICID could only
investigate crimes that occurred either before it got into, or
while operating in Darfur, such tailgating inquiry is always prone
to accident. Had an on-site inquiry into the Bosnian genocide
been conducted, and halted at the precise moment when the
killing of Bosnian Muslims in Sarajevo, the Gora~de, Luka and
other camps took place,5 4 the world would never have known
that dolus specialiswas only a very haul away, or indeed unfolding
51. Id. 245.
52. Id. 246.
53. Id.
54. The ICJ found no specific intent with regards to the acts committed in these
camps. See Bosnia v. Serbia case, supra note 1, 1 246-77.
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at another corner of the Bosnian landscape, and genocide would
never have been proved.
D. Determining "ProtectedPeople" Under Article II of the Genocide
Convention: What Is Wrong with the Objective Test?
The ICID's work on whether the victims of Darfur attacks
constituted a protected group under Article II of the Genocide
Convention is sterling, and ordinarily merits no further comments. However, the Commission's rejection of the objective
test, as the sole basis for determining what constitutes a "protected group" raises an interesting legal point worthy of consideration. As already noted, to establish genocide it must be
proved that the prohibited act has been committed against a
protected group, distinguishable from the attackers,, with the
specific intent to destroy them in whole or in part.55 However,
not only did the Genocide Convention offer no definition of
"protected group," its travaux preparatoiresreveal sharp disagreements among states as to what meaning to attribute to the
phrase.5 6
The ICID first applied the objective test in order to ascertain whether the victims and attackers in Darfur constituted distinct groups.5 7 Under this test, the Commission rejected that
tribes per se could form the basis of a protected group,58 except
where tribes constitute a distinct "racial, national, ethnical or religious group. ''5 Though it acknowledged that "in recent years
the perception of differences [between Africans and Arabs] has
heightened and has extended to distinctions that were earlier
not the predominant basis for identity,"6 the Commission ruled
that the various tribes that have been the object of the attacks
and killings "do not appear to make up ethnic groups distinct
from the ethnic group to which persons or militias that attack
them belong."'" It reasoned that both the victims and the attack55. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
56. See Lawrence J. Leblanc, The United Nations Genocide Convention and Political
Groups: Should the United States Propose an Amendment?, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 268, 271
(1988) (citing U.N. GAOR C.6, 75th mtg. at 115-16, U.N. Doc. A/633 (1948)).
57. See ICID Report, supra note 3, 1 508.
58. See id. 496.
59. Id.
60. Id. 510.

61. Id. 7 508.
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ers:
[S] peak the same language (Arabic) and embrace the same
religion (Muslim). In addition, also due to the high measure
of intermarriage, they can hardly be distinguished in their
outward physical appearance from the members of the tribes
that allegedly attacked them. Furthermore, inter-marriage
and coexistence in both social and economic terms, have over
the years tended to blur the distinction between the groups.
Apparently, the sedentary and nomadic character of the
groups constitutes one of the main distinctions between
them.6 2
Upon the application of the so-called subjective test however,6"
the Commission found that there exists subjective distinction between the victims and the crime perpetrators in Darfur as to constitute tribal difference for the purpose of the crime constituting
genocide. It reasoned that:
If objectively the two sets of persons at issue do not make up
two distinct protected groups, the question arises as to
whether they may nevertheless be regarded as such subjectively, in that they perceive each other and themselves as constituting distinct groups.... The rift between tribes, and the
political polarization around the rebel opposition to the central authorities, has extended itself to issue of identity. Those
tribes in Darfur who support rebels have increasingly come to
be identified as "African" and those supporting the government as the "Arabs." ... For these reasons it may be considered that the tribes who were victims of attacks and killings
subjectively make up a protected group.6 4
Surely, it is not easy to tell one tribal group from another where
co-existence and commingling amongst various groups is commonplace and interactions have blunted formal sharp edges of
cultural distinctions. 65 The nature of this problem is underscored, for instance, by the exceedingly complex Khmer Rouge's
mass killings in Cambodia.6 6 As Van Schaack has pointed out, "a
close reading of the Genocide Convention leads to a surprising
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
See id. 11 509-10.
Id. 1 509-12.
On the identification of this problem in the Rwanda case, see ALAIN DESTEXHE,
RWANDA AND GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 36 (1995).
66. See infta notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
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This is because, as Fournet ob-

Although the Cambodian massacre perpetrated by the Khmer
Rouge (1975-1978) is widely defined as genocide, most of the
acts committed are in reality not covered by the Convention.
Thus, some of the crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge
would fall within the scope of the Convention while others
would not, because the victims did
not constitute a national,
68
ethnic, racial, or religious group.
Doubtless, the application of the subjective test to the Darfur situation proved tremendously useful to the ICID, the question remains whether, on its own, the objective test would not
have sufficed in the circumstances. In Prosecutorv. Akayesu, the
ICTR was faced with the problem of distinguishing between the
Hutu genocidaires and their Tutsi victims.69 The Trial Chamber
acknowledged that the two groups shared so many similar features, such as color and culture, as to make distinguishing between them practically impossible.7 ° Nevertheless, the tribunal
held that the tribes were distinct because the Belgian colonizers
established a system of identity cards differentiating between the
two groups, and that this was confirmed by the self-perception of
each group.7 1 The Tribunal stated: "all the Rwandan witnesses
who appeared before it invariably answered spontaneously and
without hesitation the questions of the Prosecutor regarding
''
their ethnic identity. 72
The Chamber further stated that what was required by the
international rules on genocide was that the targeted group be
"a stable and permanent group," 73 "constituted in a permanent
fashion and membership of which is determined by birth. 7 4
67. Beth Van Schaack, The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Convention Blind Spot, 106 YALE L.J. 2259, 2261 (1997).
68. Id. The Khmer Rouge committed genocide against Buddhists (a religious
group), and the Vietnamese community which was totally eradicated, with the Chinese
and the Muslim Cham massacred. See generally CAROLINE FOURNET, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES: THEORIES, PRACrICE AND EVOLUTION 74 (2006).

69. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998).
70. See id. 102 n.56.
71. See id. 83. Writing about the Hutus and Tutsis, Alan Destexhe observes that
"[t] here were certainly distinguishable social categories in existence before the arrival of
the colonisers." DESTEXHE, supra note 65, at 36 (emphasis added).

72. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment,
73. Id.
74. Id. 511.

1

702.
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True, the Chamber noted that "a stable and permanent group"
is an objective criterion, which needs to be completed with the
subjective element of self-perception, 75 but such complementarity is not required where there are more cogent and compelling
objective factors than stability and permanence. In the 1999
cases of Nulyarimma v. Thompson and Buzzacott v. Hill, the Australian Federal Court ruled that the Australian aboriginal tribes
could constitute a racially and ethnically distinct group, on account of their ethnicity, religion, culture, language, and color.76
In its report on the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace
and Security of Mankind, the ILC77 "was of the view that the article [17 of the Draft Code] covered the prohibited acts when
committed with the necessary intent against members of a tribal
group. '78 William Schabas regards the label "group" as flexible,
enabling the Genocide Convention to apply to the destruction
79
of entities that may not qualify as "minorities.
There is hardly any doubt-except obviously in the minds
of the ICID members-that apart from ethnically distinct,
(which the ICID confirmed), the victims and perpetrators of
Darfur crimes constitute distinct tribes so that, in the absence of
the subjective test, they could still have constituted a protected
group under Article II. The attackers were Arabs; the attacked
were Africans, with all the tell-apart features of color and creed
in between. It would have been interesting to see how the black
Darfurian victims of the crimes would have responded, had the
ICID cared or opportuned to ask them, as the ICTR did with the
Tutsis, questions about their self-perception. It is certainly bewildering that international tribunals would more readily accept a
distinction of peoples on the basis of identity cards, while discountenancing cultural and physical differences as a cogent factor simply because the two concerned groups have commingled.
In concluding this Part, it must be said that the Commission's reasoning (and, hence, decision as to whether genocide
75. Id. 702.
76. See Nulyarimma v. Thompson (1999)165 A.L.R. 621; Buzzacott v. Hill [1999]
FCA 1192.
77. See generally Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the work of itsforty-eighth
session, supra note 31.
78. Id. at 45.
79. See WILLIAM A. SCrlABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw: THE CRIMES OF
CRIMES

108 (2000).
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occurred in Darfur) leaves too many wide cracks, especially
when compared with the ICJ's judgment in Bosnia v. Serbia.
There are good reasons to conclude that the Commission did
not do all it should have done in determining whether genocide
occurred in Darfur. Despite its limitations, and its avowed intention not to adopt the standards of a full criminal tribunal, the
standards adopted by the ICID in determining whether genocide occurred in Darfur were both stifling and surrealistically
high. No doubt, proving dolus specialis in the absence of conclusive evidence is difficult, and it behoves a criminal tribunal to
ensure that the case is proved beyond reasonable doubts. Nonetheless, it is a cardinal principle of criminal law that circumstantial evidence is crucial in criminal prosecutions. In the Jelisie
case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber ruled that:
As to proof of specific intent, it may, in the absence of direct
explicit evidence, be inferred from a number of facts and circumstances, such as the general context, the perpetration of
other culpable acts systematically directed against the same
group, the scale of atrocities committed, the systematic targeting of victims on account of their membership of a particular
group, or the repetition of destructive and discriminatory
acts.8"

II. BOSNIA V. SERBIA AND THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
A. Attributing Responsibility for Genocide: Serbia and the
Srebrenica Massacre
An analysis of the ICJ's decision on Serbia's responsibility
for genocide in Bosnia must commence with a brief outline of
the Bosnia/Herzegovina crisis and the latter's case before the
ICJ.
Bosnia v. Serbia8" arose from suits brought by the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina8 2 on March 20, 1993, against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia8 3 with respect to a dispute concerning alleged violations of the Convention on the Prevention and
47 (July 5, 2001).
80. Prosecutor v. Jelisit, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Judgment,
81. See generally Bosnia v. Serbia case, supra note 1.
82. Later known simply as Bosnia and Herzergovina [hereinafter Bosnia]. See id.
1.
83. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was known as "Serbia and Montenegro"
from February 4, 2003 onward, and was renamed Serbia on June 3, 2006, after Montenegro's independence. See id.
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Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.8 4 The applicant and the
claimant were two of the six states and two autonomous provinces that formed what, until 1992, was known as the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("SFRY'). In addition to Serbia,
SFRY consisted of Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, Montenegro,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina.
For various reasons, the SFRY collapsed in 1991.85 The
events that led to the current suit started in October 1991, when,
by a "sovereignty" resolution, the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its independence from the SFRY.8 6 On October 24, 1991, the Serb Members of the Bosnian Parliament proclaimed a separate Assembly of the Serb Nation/Assembly of the
Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina.8 7 The latter, which had
been renamed the Republika Srpska on August 12, 1992, declared independence from Bosnia and Herzegovina.8 8 Following a referendum on March 1, 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina
formally declared its own independence from the SFRY.89 The
United States, the European Union, and the U.N. recognized
the referendum vote on May 22, 1992.90
B. Bosnia's Case before the InternationalCourt ofJustice ("ICJ")
In its application to the ICJ, Bosnia claimed that the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY'):
[D]irectly, or through the use of its surrogates, has violated
and is violating the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, by destroying in part, and
attempting to destroy in whole, national, ethnical or religious
groups within the, but not limited to the, territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including in particular,
the Muslim population, by killing members of the group;
causing deliberate bodily or mental harm to members of the
group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
84. See generally Genocide Convention, supra note 28.
85. For an account of events leading to the collapse of the Social Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia ("SFRY'), see generally John Borrell Zagreb, Yugoslavia - The Old Demons
Arise, TIME, Aug. 6, 1990.
86. See Bosnia v. Serbia case, supra note 1, 1 231-34.
87. Id. 1 233.
88. Id.
89. Id. 1 234.
90. Id.
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calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or
in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group.9'
The massive killings and other crimes referred to in Bosnia's application occurred across the country,9 2 but it was the massacre
at Srebrenica that proved the most devastating not only to Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also the international community as a
whole.93
The Srebrenica murders were perpetrated by the remaining
elements of the Yugoslav army in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
VRS which, at this time, had been joined by Bosnian Serbs who
were serving in the Yugoslav People's Army (Jugo slovenska
narodna armija),9 both forces allegedly acting under some form
of direction from Belgrade, Serbia's capital.9 5 The main issue
for determination, therefore, was whether Serbia was responsible
for the massacre. To answer this question, the Court had to determine whether the FRY army acted along with the Bosnian
Serb armed forces in the massacre, and whether the FRY leadership had a hand in preparing, planning or in any way carrying
out the massacres at Srebrenica in particular.
C. Attributing the Srebrenica Genocide to Serbia:
The ICJ's Findings
The ILC Articles of Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts ("ASRIWA") provides for three principal bases upon which the Srebrenica genocide could be attributed to
Serbia. These are namely: conduct of organs which, according
to the internal laws of Serbia, are organs of that State; conduct of
entities which, although do not constitute organs of Serbia
under its internal law, are nevertheless deemed to act on its behalf and are regarded as de jure organs of Serbia; conduct of
entities which are neither organs of Serbia under its internal law,
nor constitute its de jure organs, but which are, by virtue of operating under some control or instruction of Serbia or its de jure
91. Id. 7 65.

92. Id.

246-53.

93. Id. 7 278-97.
94. The Yugoslav National Army.
95. See Bosnia v. Serbia case, supra note 1,

238.
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organs, are deemed as de facto organs of Serbia for the purpose
of attribution.
1. Attributing the Conducts of Serbia's Organs
Simpliciter and De Jure
Article 4(1) of the ASRIWA embodies the customary international law principle that "[t]he conduct of any State organ
shall be considered an act of that State under international law,
whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any
other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of
the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central
government or of a territorial unit of the State. 9 6 A State organ
is defined as including "any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the State."9 7 The first
question is whether the FRY or its military, being indisputably an
organ of Serbia under its internal law, took part in the Srebrenica massacre.
Although the Court found evidence of direct or indirect
participation of Serbia "in military operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the years prior to the events at Srebrenica, "98 it held
that "[ilt has however not been shown that there was any such
participation in relation to the massacres committed at Srebrenica."9 9 The Court then turned to Bosnia's second claim that the
VRS, including General Mladi , remained under the FRY military administration at the relevant time, and accordingly, "were
dejure organs of [the FRY], intended by their superiors to serve
in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the VRS."' ° Serbia conceded
that it was indeed responsible for the payment, promotion and
pensions of some elements of the VRS. It nevertheless insisted
that this did not include General Mladit, the principal character
in the Srebrenica massacre.
In its judgment, the Court stated that even if it were to regard General Mladi as a VRS officer under Serbia's administration, as alleged by Bosnia, it "does not consider that he would,
96. Int'l Law Comm. [ILC], 53rd Sess., Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, Ch.Il, art. 4(1), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1 (July 26, 2001) [hereinafter Responsibility of States].
97. Id. art. 4(2).
98. Bosnia v. Serbia case, supra note 1, 386.
99. Id.
100. Id. 387.
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for that reason alone, have to be treated as an organ of the FRY
for the purposes of the application of the rules of State responsibility."" °1 According to the Court, the term "State organ," as
used in customary international law and in Article 4 of ASRIWA,
applies to "one or other of the individual or collective entities
which make up the organization of the State and act on its behalf."10 2
2. Attributing the Conduct of Serbia's De Facto Organs
In addition to requesting the attribution of Serbia's organs
under its internal law and its dejure organs, Bosnia also claimed
that the VRS and the paramilitary entities active in Srebrenica,
such as "the Scorpions," "the Tigers" and the "White Eagles"
must be deemed, notwithstanding their apparent status, as "de
facto organs" of the FRY, in particular at the time in question, so
that all of their acts, and specifically the massacres in Srebrenica,
must be considered attributable to the FRY, just as if they had
been organs of that State under its internal law. The issue of "de
facto organs" of State always arises whenever the Court has to
determine whether it is possible in principle to attribute to a
State the conduct of persons-or groups of persons-who, while
they do not have the legal status of State organs, in fact act
under such strict control by the State that they must be treated
as its organs for purposes of the necessary attribution leading to
the State's responsibility for an internationally unlawful act.
The ICJ turned to its jurisprudence in the Military and
ParamilitaryActivities in and againstNicaragua' 3 for guidance. In
that case, confronted with the question whether -the United
States could be held responsible for the activities of the Contras
against the Nicaraguan government, the Court had stated that it
first had to determine:
[W]hether or not the relationship of the contras to the
United States Government was so much one of dependence
on the one side and control on the other that it would be
right to equate the contras, for legal purposes, with an organ
of the United States Government, or as acting on behalf of
101. Id.

102. Id.;

388.
seeJAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON

94 (2002).
103. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
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10 4

that Government.

According to this proposition, the two issues to be ascertained
before conducts of de facto organs can be attributed to a State
are viz: "complete dependence" on, and "control" of, the State
over the concerned entities. In Bosnia v. Serbia, the Court stated
that:
Persons or entities may, for purposes of international responsibility, be equated with State organs even if that status does
not follow from internal law, provided that in fact the persons, groups or entities act in "complete dependence" on the
0 5
State, of which they are ultimately merely the instrument.1
Turning first to the issue of dependence, the Court had to determine whether at the time in question, the persons or entities
that committed the acts of genocide in Srebrenica had such ties
with the FRY that they can be deemed to have been completely
dependent on it. The Court held that "[a] t the relevant time...
neither the Republika Srpska nor the VRS could be regarded as
mere instruments through which the FRY was acting, and as lacking any real autonomy. '"106 Although it recognized that "political, military and logistical relations between the federal authorities in Belgrade and the authorities in Pale, between the Yugoslav army and the VRS, had been strong and close in previous
years ...

and these ties undoubtedly remained powerful,"'0 7 the

Court did not think this was strong enough to prove the total
subjugation of the Republika Srpska by Serbia.
The Court said that the relations between the two were, "at
least at the relevant time, not such that the Bosnian Serbs' political and military organizations should be equated with organs of
the FRY."1 08 It drew attention to the differences existing at the
time between the Yugoslav and Bosnian Serb authorities over
strategic options and held these to be at least:
[E]vidence that the latter had some qualified, but real, margin of independence. Nor, notwithstanding the very important support given the Respondent to the Republika Srpska,
without which it could not have "conduct[ed] its crucial or
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 62.
Bosnia v. Serbia case, supra note 1,
Id. 394.
Id.
Id.

1

392.
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most significant military and paramilitary activities" . . . did
this signify a total dependence of the Republika Srpska upon
the Respondent.' °9
The second element in attributing conduct of de facto organs to
States is control. This customary international law requirement
is expressed in Article 8 of ASRIWA thus:
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or
group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or
under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out
the conduct. 1 0
The purpose of the "control test" is not to decide whether the
concerned entity or group of persons constitute, under Serbia's
internal law, its dejure or de facto organ, but whether the entity
acts under the instruction of Serbia or its competent representatives. The effect of a positive determination implies that the
FRY's international responsibility would be incurred owing to
the conduct of its own organs which gave instructions or exercised control relating to the commission of acts in breach of its
international obligations. The main issue for consideration
therefore is whether entities, which are incontestably FRY's organs under its internal law, "originated the genocide by issuing
instructions to the perpetrators or exercising direction or control, and whether, as a result, the conduct of the Respondent,
having been the cause of the commission of acts in breach of its
international obligations, constituted a violation of those obligations.""'
The basis of the control test principle is to be found in the
ICJ's Nicaragua judgment. Having rejected that the Contras
were de facto organs of the United States, the Court stated that
the responsibility of the United States could still arise if it were
proved that it had itself "directed or enforced the perpetration
of the acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian law alleged by the applicant State.""' 2 The Court elucidated further,
"[flor this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the
109.
were not
110.
111.
112.

Id. The Court, using this same method, had determined that the "Scorpions"
completely dependent on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. See id. 395.
Responsibility of States, supra note 96, art. 8.
Bosnia v. Serbia case, supra note 1, 397.
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. V. U.S.), 1986 I.G.J. 14, 64 (June
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United States, it would in principle have to be proved that that
State had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed."' 13
In Bosnia v. Serbia, the Court rejected Bosnia's contention
that Serbia was in effective control of the VRS and the "Scorpions" or that Serbia's organs issued such instructions to those entities as to warrant an attribution of their conducts to Serbia via
its organs.
D. Analysis of the ICJ's Judgment on the Question of
Serbia's Responsibility
1. The "Effective Control Test" and Bosnia v. Serbia: A Round
Peg in a Square Hole
In claiming that the VRS and the "Scorpions" were de facto
organs of Serbia, Bosnia argued that, given the peculiar nature
of genocide-that the crime may be composed of a considerable
number of specific acts separate, to a greater or lesser extent, in
time and space-an assessment of the "effective control" of Serbia on the concerned entities should be in relation to the whole
body of operation carried out by the direct perpetrators of genocide and not the specific acts. Consequently, Bosnia proposed
that the Court should apply the "overall control" test adopted by
14
the ICTY in the Tadie case.'
The Court rejected Bosnia's proposition on two grounds.
First, it viewed a substitution of the "effective control" with "overall control" as entailing a lowering of the threshold of proof. As
far as the Court was concerned:
[T]he particular characteristics of genocide do not justify the
Court in departing from the criterion elaborated in... (Nicaragua v. United States of America).... The rules for attributing
alleged internationally wrongful conduct to a State do not
vary with the nature of the wrongful act in question in the
absence of a clearly expressed lex specialis.'15
The Court attempted to justify its position by asserting that
"[t] his is the state of customary international law, as reflected in
113.
Article 8
114.
115.

Id. at 65 (emphasis added). Note that the word "effective" did not appear in
of ASRIWA. See Responsibility of States, supra note 96, art. 8.
Prosecutor v. Tadit, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment (May 7, 1997).
Bosnia v. Serbia case, supra note 1, 401.
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the ILC Articles on State Responsibility."' 6 But it is doubtful
whether the Court's approach exactly mirrors the state of customary international law or the provisions of Article 8 of ASRIWA. Certainly customary international law requires a State alleging that certain entities or persons act as de facto organs of
another State to prove that the latter exercise some form of control over that entity. What customary international law does not
do is cast the particular form of that control in stone and throw
the chisel into the outer darkness. Nor do the provisions of Article 8 calibrate the nature of that control. It would have been
thought, considering that the ASRIWA was adopted fifteen years
after the Nicaraguadecision, that the ILC would have been more
specific had it not intended the Nicaragua"effective control test"
to be amenable. On the contrary, certain members of the ILC
addressed the possibility of there being varying degrees of sufficient control required in specific legal contexts. 1 7
The jurisprudence of other international tribunals treats
the required control with some degree of flexibility. In Tadic,
the Appeals Chamber preferred "overall control" to "effective
control" as the appropriate criterion for characterizing the
armed conflict- in Bosnia and Herzegovina as international, and
for imputing the acts committed by Bosnian Serbs to the FRY
under the law of State responsibility. The Chambers stated that:
The requirement of international law for the attribution to
States of acts performed by private individuals is that the State
exercise control over the individual. The degree of control may,
however, vary according to the factual circumstances of each case.

The Appeals Chamber fails to see why in each and every circumstance internationall 8law should require a high threshold
for the test of control."

In the Celebici case, the Appeals Chambers held that "[t]he 'overall control' test could thus be fulfilled even if the armed forces
acting on behalf of the 'controlling State' had autonomous
choices of means and tactics although participating in a com-

116. Id.
117. See Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the work of its fiftieth session,
395, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. A/53/10 (Apr. 20-June 12,
1998;July 27-Aug. 14, 1998).
118. Tadi!, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment,
117 (second emphasis added).

2008]

PROVING STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR GENOCIDE

895

mon strategy along with the 'controlling State." 1 19
Interestingly, in its commentary on Article 8, the ILC did
not oppose the position taken by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in
Tadi5. All the Chamber did was to indicate that the ICTY'sjudgment was ultra vires because its mandate "is directed to issues of
individual criminal responsibility, not State responsibility, and
the question in that case concerned not the responsibility but
the applicable rules of international humanitarian law." 12' Even
then, this observation-which the ICJ endorsed in Bosnia v. Serbia-appears misplaced because the ICTY had indeed framed its
question in Tadie as one of responsibility.' 21 In any case, the ILC
accepted that "it is a matter for appreciationin each case whether
particular conduct was or was not carried out under the control
of a State, to such an extent the conduct controlled should be
22
attributed to it.'
Decisions of international tribunals in Yeager v. Islamic Republic of Iran12 and Starret Housing Corp. v. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran124 regard the control test as context-specific.
And in Loizidou v. Turkey, 125 a case concerning a Greek Cypriot's
claim that Turkish soldiers prevented her from accessing her
property in Northern Cyprus, the European Court of Human
Rights recognized that effective control could be exercised directly or indirectly.

12 6

The main problem with the "control" test adopted by the
ICJ in Bosnia v. Serbia is that it practically made nonsense of the
very essence of the attributability principle. There is a major difference between Bosnia v. Serbia and the Nicaragua case that
made the application of the "effective control" test wholly unsuitable to the former. As the ICJ itself noted in the Nicaraguacase,
the United States and the Contras shared the same objectivesnamely the overthrowing of the Nicaraguan government. There
is no doubt that the Contras could have achieved this objective
without committing war crimes or crimes against humanity.
119. Prosecutor v. DeIali ("Celebici Case"), Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, 1 47
(Feb. 20, 2001) (emphasis added).
120. CRAWFORD, supra note 102, at 112.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment,
98.
CRAWFORD, supra note 102, at 112 (emphasis added).
(1987) 17 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 92, 103.
(1983) 4 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 122, 143.
310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 62 (1995).
Id.
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Therefore, in order to attribute crimes against humanity in furtherance of this objective to the United States, it was only plausible for the Court, and fair to the United States, that the crimes
themselves should be the object of United States control.
The difficulty with an indiscriminate application of the Nicaragua control test soon emerged in Bosnia v. Serbia, where, unlike Nicaragua,the shared objective is the commission of international crimes. As the Vice-President of the Court, Judge AlKhasawneh noted in his dissent:
When . . . the shared objective is the commission of interna-

tional crimes, to require both control over the non-State actors and the specific operations in the context of which international crimes were committed is too high a threshold. The
inherent danger in such an approach is that it gives States the
opportunity to carry out criminal policies through non-state
without incurring direct responsibility
actors or surrogates
27
therefore.'

It is thus clear that the ILC and the ICTY's positions reflect, to a
greater extent than the ICJ, the state of customary international
law on the modality of control to be proved in respect of an allegation of de facto organs of States.
2. The Court's Treatment of Evidence: The Particular Case of
the Supreme Defence Council Documents
One of the most intriguing aspects of the Court's judgment
in Bosnia v. Serbia is undoubtedly the manner in which the Court
treated salient provisions of its own Statute, especially with respect to materials that went to the core of the case before it. In
an interesting episode, Bosnia drew the Court's attention to the
existence of "redacted" sections of documents of the Supreme
Defence Council of Serbia and requested the ICJ to ask that Serbia furnish it with unedited versions of the documents.1 2 ' Had
the Court obliged Bosnia, Serbia's non-compliance would have
1' 29
entitled the Court to make "[f] ormal note ... of any refusal.'
But despite its power to do so under Article 49 of its Statute and
Article 62(2) of the Rules of the Court, the Court declined Bos127. Bosnia v. Serbia case, supra note 1,
Al-Khasawneh).
128. See id. 1 205-06.
129. Id. 205.

39 (dissenting opinion of Vice-President
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nia's request. The Court gave as its reason the fact that "the Applicant has extensive documentation and other evidence available to it, especially from the readily accessible ICTY records." 3 °
To compound this befuddlement, the Court stated, in paragraph 206 of its judgment, that "[a]lthough [it] has not agreed
to either of the Applicant's requests to be provided with unedited copies of the documents, it has not failed to note the Applicant's suggestion that the Court may be free to draw its own conclusions. ' 3 1
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Al-Khasawneh highlighted
the untowardness of the Court's response to Bosnia's request:
In addition to this completely unbalanced statement that
does not meet the requirement of Article 49, no conclusions
whatsoever were drawn from noting the Respondent's refusal
to divulge the contents of the unedited documents. It would
normally be expected that the consequences of the note
taken by the Court would be to shift the onus probandi or to
allow a more liberal recourse to inference as the Court's past
of common sense and fairness
practice and considerations
1 32
would all demand.
The Court's handling of Bosnia's request that Serbia be required
to disclose such vital materials was, to say the least, utterly
strange. Surely, as the Court stated in Nicaragua, "it is the litigant seeking to establish a fact who bears the burden of proving
it."' 133 But this rule somehow assumes that the litigant has access
to the evidential materials that bear on the alleged fact. This
obviously was not the case in this instance. It is in recognition
that a State's total control of its evidential materials may significantly affect another's ability to prove its claim against the former that a State, which has been denied such access, is entitled
to draw more liberal inferences from the refusal.
In the Corfu Channel case, the Court stated that:
On the other hand, the fact of this exclusive territorial control exercised by a State within its frontiers has a bearing
upon the methods of proof available to establish the knowledge of that State, the victim of a breach of international law,
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. 206.
Id.
Id. 35 (dissenting opinion of Vice-President A1-Khasawneh).
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. V. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 437 (Nov.
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is often unable to furnish direct proof of facts giving rise to
responsibility. Such a State should be allowed a more liberal
recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence.
This indirect evidence is admitted in all systems of law, and its
use is recognized by international decisions. It must be regarded as of special weight when it is based on a series of facts
linked together and leading logically to a single conclusion.'

34

The Court in Bosnia v. Serbia should have granted Bosnia's request, even if Serbia would refuse, with the consequence that
Bosnia be allowed to liberally draw its references while the Court
takes a formal note of the refusal. But what happened was that
the Court declined Bosnia's request, ignored the principle allowing Bosnia to draw liberal references and, more curiously, reserved for itself, ostensibly at Bosnia's suggestion, the right to
"draw its own conclusions.' 35 Article 49 of the ICJ Statute provides that "a formal note should be taken of any refusal" and not
1 36
of the Applicant's suggestions.
Whatever made the ICJ refuse to apply Article 49 procedures to an issue so fundamental to the case before it must remain, at this time, conjectural. Be that as it may, it is one thing
for the Court to refuse to exercise its constitutional powers despite a pressing need to do so, but it is quite another thing for it
to resort to shifty reasoning to excuse such behavior: it is even
more troubling that the Court would so glaringly incorrectly apply the provision of its own Statute on the back of it all.
3. Determining the Genocidal Intent of Serbia: Looking for a
Needle in a Haystack
One major tension point in the Bosnia v. Serbia decision is
with regards to how the Court went about precluding the genocidal intent of Serbia. Bosnia had implored the Court to infer the
genocidal intent of Serbia from the pattern of acts committed
against several groups in several parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina."7 Bosnia referred to the Decision on Strategic Goals is-

sued on May 12, 1992 by Momilo Krajignik, as President of the
National Assembly of Republika Srpska, which allegedly showed
134.
135.
136.
137.

Corfu Channel (U.K v.Alb.), 1949 I.C.J 4, 18 (Apr. 9) (emphasis added).
Bosnia v. Serbia case, supra note 1, 205.
See id. 35 (dissenting opinion of Vice-President AI-Khasawneh).
See id.
252-56, 262-73, 307-10, 312-18.
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that the objectives defined in that document represented the
joint view of President Milogevie
of Serbia and President
1 38
Karadfie of Republika Srpska
There is no doubt that, given the grave nature of genocide
and the implication of placing the responsibility for it on a
State's shoulders, there is a need for the Court to be strict in how
it characterizes these acts, especially given disagreement about
how to interpret the strategic goal at issue here. What is interesting, however, is the basis upon which the Court refused to infer
the specific intent to commit genocide from the consistent pattern of conduct in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Court gave two reasons for rejecting Bosnia's contention. The first ground concerns Bosnia's argument that it was a
joint strategic goal of Serbia and Republika Srpska to "drive our
enemies by force of war from their homes."' 9 The Court stated
that the applicant's argument "does not come to terms with the
fact that an essential motive of much of the Bosnian Serb leadership-to create a larger Serb State, by a war of conquest if necessary-did not necessarily require the destruction of the Bosnian
14
Muslims and other communities, but their expulsion.""
The
Court noted further that:
The 1992 objectives, particularly the first one, were capable of
being achieved by the displacement of the population and by
territory being acquired, actions which the Respondent accepted... as being unlawful since they would be at variance
with the inviolability of borders and the territorial integrity of
a State which has just been recognized internationally. 4 '
Surely the Court was not required to give an assessment of the
military strategy of the Bosnian Serbs, but to determine whether
the pattern of acts committed by the latter manifested a genocidal intent. The Court's response was thus tantamount to replacing concrete evidence with hypothetical considerations of what
might have been. If the simple goal of Serbia was to simply establish a State of Serbia, as the Court claimed, how then does one
account for all the killings that took place? Would such be a
necessary means for accomplishing that goal?
138.
139.
140.
141.

See id. 1 371.
Id. 372.
Id.
Id.
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The Court's second argument for rejecting Bosnia's claim
arose from the weight the Court attached to the ICTY's decision
regarding a similar claim. The Court stated that the applicant's
proposition "is not consistent with the findings of the ICTY relating to genocide or with the actions of the Prosecutor, including
decisions not to charge genocide offences in possibly relevant
indictments, and to enter into plea agreements." '4 2 Should the
fact that the ICTY did not infer genocidal intention from patterns of acts be fatal to Bosnia's claim? The ICTY only had jurisdiction, as the Court itself recognized, with determining the responsibility of individual perpetrators. 4 ' The Tribunal was
therefore only concerned with acts emanating from specific circumstances and not the general pattern of acts as would undoubtedly be the case were it to be primarily concerned with
determining State responsibility. Nor is the ICTY's allowing the
withdrawal of some of the genocide cases pending before it of
any exceptional relevance. As Judge Al-Khasawneh argues,
"prosecutorial conduct is often based on expediency and therefore no conclusions can be drawn from the prosecution's acceptance of a plea bargain or failure to charge a particular person
with genocide. 1 4 4
What the Court should have done-but which it did not
do-was to consider the trend of international tribunals' jurisprudence on inferring genocidal intent from circumstantial evidence. In KrstiW, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that "when
direct evidence of genocidal intent is absent, the intent may still
be inferred from the factual circumstances of the crime.' 45 The
ICTR Appeals Chamber affirmed what the Trial Chamber stated
in Prosecutorv. Rutaganda that:
It is possible to deduce the genocidal intent inherent in a particular act charged from the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against the
same group, whether these acts were committed by the same
offender or by others. Other factors, such as the scale of
atrocities committed, their general nature, in a region or a
country, or furthermore, the fact of deliberately and systematically targeting victims on account of their membership of a
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. 374.
See id. 1 403.
See id. 1 42 (dissenting opinion of Vice-President A1-Khasawneh).
Prosecutor v. Krstit, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, 1 34 (Apr. 19, 2004).
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particular group, while excluding the members of other
groups, can enable the Chamber to infer the genocidal intent
of a particular act.' 46

Although the Chamber was not prepared to accept mere antiTutsi utterances or simply being affiliated to an extremist antiTutsi group as sine qua non for establishing dolus specialis, it indicated that such facts might, nonetheless, facilitate proof of specific intent.'4 7 The Chamber also held in Prosecutor v. Musema
that "in practice, intent can be, on a case-by-case basis, inferred
from the material evidence submitted to the Chamber, including the evidence which demonstrates a consistent pattern of conduct by the Accused." '4 8 Finally in Kayishema the Chamber
stated that:
The perpetrator's actions, including circumstantial evidence,
however may provide sufficient evidence of intent .... The

Chamber finds that the intent can be inferred from words or
deeds and may be demonstrated by a pattern of purposeful
action. In particular, the Chamber considers evidence such
as the physical targeting of the group or their property; the
use of derogatory language toward members of the targeted
group; the weapons employed and the extent of bodily injury;
the methodical way of planning, the systematic manner of
killing. Furthermore, the number of victims from the group
is also important. 4 9
There is no shortage of cases in which international tribunals
have inferred genocidal intent from facts and circumstances of
the case in the absence of a paper trail directly linking States or
individuals with international crimes. True, the ICJ is not bound
by decisions of other tribunals-or of its own indeed-but, as
Judge Rosalyn Higgins recently pointed out, there is the danger
that international courts and tribunals may be speaking babbles
where they do not respect each other's decision.5 0 This is par146. Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment, 1 398 (Dec. 6,
1999).
147. See Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, Judgment, 525 (May 26,

2003).
148. Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment,

1

167 (Jan. 27,

2000).
149. Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 93
(May 21, 1999).
150. See Rosalyn Higgins, A Babel ofJudicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench, 55
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 791 (2006).
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ticularly so where considerations of plausibility, coherence and
consistency dictate such steps.
4. The Court's Treatment of Serbia's "Evidence"
The last issue to consider in this Section is the manner in
which the ICJ treated Serbia's statements and the impact it had
on the Court's judgment. Although the Court's decision is ridden with instances of the Court's showing a disconcerting readiness to accept Serbia's claims on face value, this Section deals
with one particular example that highlights the incongruous nature of this approach.
In its claim that Serbia violated Article 111(a) of the Genocide Convention, Bosnia claimed that Serbia had formally accepted responsibility for the crime of genocide that Bosnia alleged against it."' In justification, Bosnia referred to an official
declaration made by the Council of Ministers of Serbia on June
15, 2005, following the showing on a Belgrade television channel
by a
on June 2, 2005, of a video-recording of the murder
152
paramilitary unit of six Bosnian Muslim prisoners.
The declaration generally condemned the killing in
Srebrenica, but in a crucial part, it stated that the perpetrators
and the organizers did not represent Serbia or Montenegro,
"but an undemocratic regime of terror and death, against whom
the majority of citizens of Serbia and Montenegro put up the
strongest resistance." 15 ' Directly in issue here is the implication
of this sentence on Serbia's responsibility. The Ministers acknowledged the crime but placed the responsibility for it, not on
the new government of Serbia, but on the fallen administration
under Milogevi.
In its response to Bosnia's claim that the statement "be regarded as a form of admission and as having decisive probative
force regarding the attributability to the Yugoslav State of the
Srebrenica massacre," 154 the Court said that this declaration was
of a political nature and was "not intended as an admission,
which would have had a legal effect in complete contradiction to
the submissions made by the Respondent before this Court, both
151.
152.
153.
154.

See Bosnia v. Serbia case, supra note 1,
See id.
Id.
Id.

1 377.
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' 155
at the time of the declaration and subsequently."
Of course the Court is entitled to attach whatever weight it
deems fit to evidential materials pleaded before it. The question
though is whether the Court should, with such ease, dismiss what
appears to be a clear statement of admission by the top echelon
of the Serbian government? In the Nuclear Tests case, 156 the
Court stated that unilateral acts, in particular by highly placed
government officials, can have binding legal consequences.
There the Court also stated that intentions must be considered
in the context of which statements were made and not in

vacuo.157 In Bosnia v. Serbia, the Court neither accepted that the

Ministers' statement had any consequential legal effect on Serbia's responsibility nor showed any serious consideration of the
particular context in which the statement was made.
III. ATTRIBUTING RESPONSIBILITY TO SUDAN
When considering the ICID's decision on Sudan's responsibility for genocide, the first question to ask is why did the commission decide to determine Sudan's responsibility for a crime it
did not find to have been committed in the first place?
The answer to this question is not quite obvious from the
ICID report or from its mandate which had clearly intended that
the duty to ascertain those who are responsible for the crime
only arose after, not regardless of whether, the crime was found
to have been committed.
It may be that the ICID's conviction that "[o]ne should not
rule out the possibility that in some instances single individuals,
including Government officials, may entertain a genocidal intent,"'
compelled it to categorically, though legally inexpediently, exempt the Government of Sudan collectively from responsibility. But this then raises another curiosity: if the Commission contemplated, as it clearly did, the possibility of a
subsequent discovery of genocidal intent (implying a subsequent
finding that genocide was committed in Darfur), and individual
155. Id. 1 378.
156. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 L.CJ. 457, 473 (Dec. 2).
157. Id. at 474; see also Bosnia v. Serbia case, supra note 1, 1 57 (dissenting opinion
of Vice-President AI-Khasawneh).
158. ICID Report, supra note 3, 1 520 (emphasis in original).
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government members might yet be implicated, why the hasty exoneration of the government as a whole?
Whatever may be the reasons for the ICID's somewhat tawdry decision to ascertain Sudan's responsibility for a crime it did
not find to have been committed or pronounce on the innocence of the State despite being aware of the possibility of future
indictment of some of its officials, that does not preclude an examination of how precisely the Commission went about the task.
A. Attributing the Darfur Crime to Sudan under State
Responsibility Law
The question of attributing genocide to Sudan arises, as
with the ICJ, under Articles 4 and 8 of ASRIWA.' 5 9 The issue
here is to determine whether the conduct of the Sudanese regular army, widely alleged to have participated in many of the
crimes against the African tribes in Darfur, is attributable to the
State. Additionally, it is important to inquire whether the Darfur
non-State actors, such as the dominant Arab militias, the
Janjaweed and the Popular Defence Forces ("PDF"), act as de
facto or de jure organs of Sudan for the purpose of attribution.
b. The Link Between the Sudanese Government, the
Janjaweed and the Popular Defence Forces ("PDF")
On January 28, 2004, the Sudanese Minister of Defense formally clarified the relationship between the different entities active in Darfur and the Government of the Sudan.16 ° The Minister differentiated between "rebels," the 'janjaweed," the "Popular Defence Forces," the "tribal militias," such as the Fur tribe,
and the "Nahayein" of the Zaghawa.1 61 He stated that the "PDF
are volunteers who aid the armed forces but the Janjaweed are
'gangs of armed bandits' with which the government has no relations whatsoever.

'

162

In a stark contrast to his Minister's distancing of the
Janjaweed from the Government of the Sudan, President Bashir,
speaking to the people of Kulbus-a town rebels had failed to
overrun in December 2003, stated " [o]ur priority from now on is
159.
160.
161.
162.

See CRAWFORD, supra note 102 at 94-113.
See ICID Report, supra note 3, 1 118.
See id.
Id.
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to eliminate the rebellion, and any outlaw is our target.... We
will use the army, the police, the mujahedeen, the horsemen to get
rid of the rebellion."1 6 In an even more revealing episode, the
Minister of Justice told an ad hoc delegation of the Committee
on Development and Cooperation of the European Parliament
during its visit in February 2004:
[T]he Government made a sort of relationship with the
Janjaweed. Now the Janjaweed abuse it. I am sure that the Government is regretting very much any sort of commitments between 64
them and the Government. We now treat them as outlaws."

1

There is no contradiction in the accounts of the various Sudanese government officials on the nature of the relationship
between the Government of the Sudan and the Janjaweed, the
only militia the Government has always denied involvement with.
The President's speech, acknowledging that the horsemen
(Janjaweed) were an instrument of government, was given in December 2003, just after the rebels' failed attempt to overrun
Kulbus.1 65 The referred breakdown in the GovernmentJanjaweed relationship must thus have taken place shortly after
that episode since the Minister for Defense's statement distancing the Government from the Janjaweed was given on January
28, 2004, just about a month before the Minister of Justice formally announced that although there was a relationship between
them before, the government now treated the Janjaweed as outlaws.16 6 By April 24th, the Minister for Foreign Affairs added

"[t] he government may have turned a blind eye toward the mili'167
tias ... [b]ecause those militias are targeting the rebellion.
Apart from the copious admissions that the Janjaweed acted
as an instrument of the Government of the Sudan, the ICID
163. Id. 119. The horsemen are the Janjaweed. The term Janjaweed derived
from "Jinn," meaning evil spirit and "Jawad," connoting mounted rider (used for both
horseman and camel-riders). Literally, the Janjaweed are "evil spirits on horsebacks"
"who looted and ransacked settled villages in what was originally of tribal disputes between nomadic Arabs and settled African farmers over land and grazing rights." Ayesha
Kajee, DarfurStereotypingFraughtwith Danger,AFICA REP. No. 81, (Oct. 31, 2006), available at http://www.saiia.org.za/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid
=997.
164. ICID Report, supra note 3, 1 119.
165. See id.
166. See id. 11 118-20.
167. Id. 119.
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found many proofs of that relationship in the several joint actions taken by the Sudan's army and the militias. 6 ' In its consideration of the question of legal responsibility for acts committed
by the Janjaweed, the ICID stated that:
The "Janjaweed" to whom most victims refer in the current
conflict are Arab militias that raid the villages of those victims.... These militias frequently operate with, or are sup-

ported by, the Government, as evidenced both by consistent
witness testimonies describing Government forces' support
during the attacks, the clear patterns in attacks conducted
across Darfur . . . and by the material gathered by the Comarming and training of
mission concerning the recruitment,
169
militias by the Government.
The ICID legally distinguished the involvement of the Government in the activities of the Janjaweed, on the one hand, and
with the PDF, on the other.1 70 The Commission regard the
Janjaweed as a de facto organ of the Sudan. It stated that:
When militias attack jointly with the armed forces, it can be
held that they act under the effective control of the Government, consistently with the notion of control set out in 1999
as de facto State
Thus they are 1acting
in TadiW (Appeal)....
71
officials of the Government of Sudan.

In contradistinction from theJanjaweed, the Commission viewed
the PDF as a de jure organ of the Sudan because that entity has
"a legislative basis under Sudanese law."'1 7 2 But where "militias
are incorporated in the PDF and wear uniforms, they acquire,
from the viewpoint of international law the status of organs of
the Sudan. 1

73

Upon the application of the "effective control test," errone168. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Sudan, U.N. Doc.
S/2005/57 (Jan. 31, 2005); Report of the Security CouncilMission to the Sudan and Chad, 410June 2006, U.N. Doc. S/2006/433 (June 22, 2006); see also BROOKINGS INST., DARFUR,
WAR CRIMES, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, AND THE QUEST FORJUSTICE (2005).
For a history of Darfur and its conflicts, see Yousef Takana, Effects of Tribal Strife in
Darfur, in PERSPECTIVES ON TRIBAL CONFLICTS IN SUDAN 195 (Adam AI-Zein Mohamed &

AI-Tayeb Ibrahim Weddai eds., Universities of Khartoum: Institute of Afro-Asian Studies, 1998); INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ("ICG"), DARFUR RISING: SUDAN'S NEW CRIsIs,
16 (ICG Africa Report No. 76, 2004).
121.
169. ICID Report, supra note 3,
170. See id. 124.
171. Id. 123.
172. Id. 108.
173. Id. 1 124.
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ously referred to by the Commission to have been laid down in
Tadie (this case applied the "overall control test"), the Commission found that "the large majority of attacks on villages conducted by the militia have been undertaken with the acquiescence of State officials. ' 174 It also established various joint kill175
ings undertaken by the militias and the Government forces,
and instances in which the PDF, being a de jure organ of the
State, actually armed, instructed and controlled the militias. In
particular, the Commission recorded an instance of such mass
killings, jointly undertaken by the government forces and the
1 76
Janjaweed, in paragraph 272 of its report, the attack on Surra
It chronicled "very credible, detailed and consistent account[s]
of the attack, in which more than 250 persons were killed, including women and a large number of children. .

.

. The

Janjaweed and the Government
forces attacked jointly in the
1 77
morning."'
the
of
early hours
Having established that there existed a relationship between
the Government of the Sudan and the militias, and that the PDF
was a de jure organ of Sudan under its internal law, and that
these groups' activities, upon proof, were attributable to Sudan,
the next question for the Commission was whether, in light of all
these, the Government was responsible for genocide.
As already noted in Part I of this Article, the ICID did not
find genocide to have occurred in Darfur, thus, the question of
attributability should never have arisen at all. But then, in considering whether genocide occurred, the Commission took the
extraordinary step of pronouncing formally on the question of
Sudan's responsibility,1 7 1 probably under the impression that it
could not determine the question of genocide without dealing
with Sudan's responsibility. If that was the case, the fact that the
ICJ managed to separate the two issues nullifies that assumption.
In any case, the Commission's rationale for excluding the
Government of the Sudan collectively from the responsibility are
the same as those it relied on in its ruling that genocide did not
occur in Darfur, save two specific rationales considered below.
The ICID stated that the lack of genocidal intent by the
174. Id. 125.
175. See id.
155, 240, 242-43, 246.
176. See id. 272.

177. Id.
178. Id. 71 518-22.
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State was manifested since villages with a mixed composition (African and Arab tribes) were not attacked.1 7 9 Examples of such
villages include Abaata, in the north-east of Zelingei, and Western Darfur, consisting of Zaghawa and members of Arab
tribes. 8 ' Additionally, in paragraph 517, the Commission referred to the evidence given by one survivor of an attack on the
Jabir village who claimed that he did not resist when attackers
took 200 camels from him, and that although they beat him up,
they did not shoot him dead."8 ' From this account, the Commission concluded that " [c]learly, in this instance the special intent
to kill a member of a group to destroy the group as such was lacking, the murder being only motivated by the desire to appropri18 2
ate cattle belonging to the inhabitants of the village [!]"
The two instances clearly show the illogicality in some of the
ICID's rationales for exculpating Sudan from responsibility.
Surely, common sense should have dictated to the Commission
that if the intent of the attackers was to destroy blacks, surely the
assailants would not attack villages comprising blacks and Arabs.
Not attacking those mixed villages should actually have been one
of the strongest indicators of a genocidal intent. And to simply
base a conclusion of this magnitude on the simple evidence of
one man-who might have been left for dead after severe beating or simply lucky to escape with his life-is not only farcical
but outrageously ludicrous.
CONCLUSION
In Bosnia v. Serbia and the Darfur Inquiry, both the ICJ and
the ICID had an opportunity-and a great one for that matterto, for the first time, determine whether States have committed
genocide. Both returned a negative verdict. The tragedy of
these decisions does not lie in their finding negatively for the
question: there can be, and there must be no assumptions about
outcomes of judicial trial or inquiries; the problem is with the
rather confounding manners in which both bodies addressed
the issue.
For the ICJ, the Court very nearly subrogated itself to Serbia
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. 516.
Id.
Id. 517.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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on many occasions, substituting its own hypothesis for the credible evidence before it. When not doing just that, the Court was
preoccupied with rather strangely applying the provisions of its
Statute (such as Articles 49 and 62 of its Rules).
It is beyond doubt that grave crimes were committed in Darfur, and if no genocide was indeed committed in that crisis, such
a conclusion cannot be safely drawn from the rather dubious
logic of the ICID. In sympathy, the ICID had considerable constraints limiting its ability, scope and ascertainment of evidence.
But then, in dealing with the evidence it did get, it chose to focus
on the most ridiculous examples to either rebut the existence of
genocide or exempt Sudan from responsibility. Despite finding
numerous "indiscriminate killings" across Darfur, the Commission chose a single incident of Wadi Saleh where the killing had
been selective to rebut genocidal intent to destroy in part or in
whole. If the Commission believed there might yet be a case of
genocide against some individual State officials in the future,
why the blanket exculpation of the Government of the Sudan
from responsibility? The Commission understood clearly that
motive had no relevance to genocide. Yet it accepted that the
destruction of villages and vile attacks were purely for counterinsurgency purposes and to steal cattle from the owners.
Whether there are extraneous pressures on the ICJ and the
ICID to return the kind of verdict they returned on the question
of the responsibility of Serbia and Sudan, as some have claimed,
is not a question that can easily be answered,' at least formally.
But no one should be naive to assume that genocide falls into
the category of crimes the responsibility for which courts or inquiry commissions can have free rein to determine. As Professor
Fein observed in 1979:
The perpetrators (of genocide) played a role in the world system as clients or allies of a major power.., the class of victims
had earlier been excluded from the universe of obligation of
the perpetrator.... In most cases... the assault against the
victim must be classified as retributive genocide... viewed by
perpetrators as reprisals against the authority of the domiIn no case did another State which had the
nant class ....
potential leverage to threaten or impose sanctions use its

183. See Udombana, supra note 47.
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power against a client or ally to thwart the murders.18

4

Whether the decisions in Bosnia v. Serbia and the Darfur Inquiry
regarding State responsibility were thus a necessitous but unholy
marriage of the law and real politik is a question only time can
answer.
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